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Ambitious civilizations that expand for resources at an intergalactic scale could be observable from
a cosmological distance, but how likely is one to be visible to us? The question comes down to esti-
mating the appearance rate of such things in the cosmos — a radically uncertain quantity. Despite
this prior uncertainty, anthropic considerations give rise to Bayesian updates, and thus predictions.
The Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA), a school of anthropic probability, has previously been used
for this purpose. Here, we derive predictions from the alternative school, the Self-Indication As-
sumption (SIA), and point out its features. SIA favors a higher appearance rate of expansionistic
life, but our existence at the present cosmic time means that such life cannot be too common (else
our galaxy would long ago have been overrun). This combination squeezes our vast prior uncertainty
into a few orders of magnitude. Details of the background cosmology fall out, and we are left with
some stark conclusions. E.g. if the limits to technology allow a civilization to expand at speed v, the
probability of at least one expanding cosmological civilization being visible on our past light cone
is 1 − v3
c3
. We also show how the SIA estimate can be updated from the results of a hypothetical
full-sky survey that detects “n” expanding civilizations (for n ≥ 0), and calculate the implied final
extent of life in the universe.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the grand mysteries of the cosmos is the role
of intelligent life. Is it a freak occurrence, rare and fleet-
ing [1]? Or is life destined to inherit and transform the
universe on the largest scale [2]?
To have an opinion on the matter is to have an opinion
on the enabling factors — the limits to practical technol-
ogy, and the appearance rate of ambitious life. Severe
bounds on either mean that life will forever be insignifi-
cant1. But the opposite case is quite possible.
It is not difficult to take the optimist position on tech-
nology. A minimal set of technologies required for this
position are high-speed spacecraft that can travel be-
tween galaxies [3], with the ability to self-replicate from
available resources [4]. Current human technology is al-
ready developing 0.2c interstellar spacecraft on a realis-
tic budget [5], and initial studies suggest that the tech-
nology gap between interstellar and intergalactic space
travel is slim [6] — the major difference is simply the
travel time. Self-replicating technology is a greater chal-
lenge from our present position, but we are surrounded
by numerous species of robust “self-replicating aircraft”
that show the basic principle at work.
The optimist position on technology implies that ex-
panding cosmological civilizations [2] are possible. Am-
bitious life, seeking to maximize access to resources,
can embark on intergalactic expansion spanning billions
of light-years, for nearly zero cost (due to use of self-
replication). The more difficult question is that of the
∗ stephanolson@boisestate.edu
1 “Insignificant” in the sense that a physical description of the
universe could be an excellent approximation without accounting
for the activities of life.
appearance rate. If ambitious life is sufficiently rare, the
universe on a large scale will hardly notice — although
such civilizations may become enormous, the cosmic ac-
celeration will ensure they remain bounded and isolated
in an otherwise sterile universe. A large appearance rate
means that the universe will quickly become completely
saturated with ambitious life.
Despite many decades of searches (from nearby
stars [7] to as far as nearby galaxies [8, 9]), no signatures
of extraterrestrial intelligence have been demonstrated.
Searches at deep cosmological distances may be forth-
coming [10], but until then, we are left with anthropic
reasoning to estimate the appearance rate — arguments
that rely on the properties of our own existence [11]. Two
pieces of anthropic information are particularly impor-
tant — we have arrived at cosmic time t0 ≈ 13.8 Gyr,
and we are apparently not within the domain of an am-
bitious civilization that is maximizing use of resources.
There are two popular schools of anthropic probabil-
ity [11]. One is known as the Self-Sampling Assumption
(SSA) — it draws conclusions about the universe by rea-
soning as though our existence is a random draw from
a “reference class” of similar life. It does not care how
often civilizations like ours actually occur, but it favors
conditions that make us more typical within the set of
those that do occur. We have previously applied SSA
reasoning to the problem of estimating the appearance
rate (and observability) of expanding cosmological civi-
lizations [12–14].
The other school is known as the Self-Indication As-
sumption (SIA). Rather than favoring our typicality
within a reference class, SIA favors conditions that are
more likely, in an absolute sense, to have produced us.
SSA and SIA make different predictions, and the question
of which is appropriate for cosmology has been debated
for decades [15–17].
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2Our main goal here is to derive the basic predictions of
SIA reasoning, for the appearance rate and observability
of expanding cosmological civilizations. We will find the
SIA approach has several attractive features. It is far less
dependent on modeling of the relative appearance rate
of life throughout cosmic time. It is far less dependent
on one’s prior assumptions about the magnitude of the
appearance rate. The resulting predictions are simple,
closed-form expressions. And they are somewhat more
optimistic for detection than SSA-based estimates.
The SIA approach also lends itself well to the next
step. Suppose that in the future, the full sky is surveyed
to great distance, detecting “n” expanding cosmological
civilizations. We show how this information updates our
SIA estimate for the appearance rate. Based on this re-
sult, we can examine the original question above — that
of the ultimate role of life in the universe. At late cosmic
times, how much of the universe will have been saturated
by ambitious life?
We organize this paper in the following way: Section
II reviews the basics of homogeneous cosmology with ex-
panding civilizations. Section III discusses SSA and SIA
in more detail, and how they are applied in the present
context. Section IV discusses the issue of our prior uncer-
tainty — an essential starting-point for Bayesian reason-
ing. Section V derives our main result — SIA estimates
for the appearance rate and observability of expanding
cosmological civilizations. Section VI shows how esti-
mates are updated (with Bayes’ theorem) after a search,
and section VII addresses the question of the end state
of life in the cosmos. Section VIII draws a direct com-
parison to previous SSA-based results, and section IX
contains our concluding remarks.
II. EXPANDING COSMOLOGICAL
CIVILIZATIONS
An expanding cosmological civilization is a hypothet-
ical form of ambitious life that has, as an instrumental
goal, the control of as many resources as possible. It is
difficult to imagine a more general final state of techno-
logical activity. In terms of utility, practically any final
goal can be more fully realized with access to more re-
sources [18]. In terms of the energetics of life, an ex-
panding cosmological civilization is a consequence of the
maximum power principle [19]. In terms of stability of
large systems, the act of not expanding requires all par-
ticipants to agree not to expand, while initiating cos-
mic expansion requires only a single, isolated decision to
launch one spacecraft that is capable of high speed and
self-replication.
Conservative assumptions on physics lead to a simple
geometry for such a civilization — expansion in all di-
rections at some fraction of the speed of light, v.2 The
2 We use units such that c = 1, and velocities are expressed as a
co-moving volume occupied by such a civilization at cos-
mic time t, having appeared at cosmic time t′ is that of
a sphere, given by:
v3 V (t′, t) =
4pi
3
v3
(∫ t
t′
1
a(t′′)
dt′′
)3
(1)
where a(t) is the cosmic scale factor3. Note that V (t′, t0)
also represents the volume of space encompassed by our
past light cone back at time t′.
At a large scale the universe is homogeneous, so the
picture is that of spherical domains randomly appearing
in space and expanding over a cosmic timescale, anal-
ogous to the geometry of a cosmological phase transi-
tion [20, 21]. Indeed, it is more than an analogy, if life
makes changes to the matter and radiation content. In-
telligent life may literally be a way for the universe to
quickly find and jump to a higher-entropy state, releas-
ing heat in the process [2].
For our purposes, we regard the velocity of expansion,
v, as the same constant for all expanding civilizations.
The justification is that the difficulty of launching high-
speed spacecraft explodes in a fairly narrow range of v.
At v = 0.2c, it is already practical for humanity [5]. But
v = 1 is strictly impossible for any civilization, no matter
how advanced, if our present understanding of physics is
not completely misleading. Thus any ambitious civiliza-
tion will likely encounter a very similar “practical speed
limit” for their spacecraft, which is the main factor in
their net expansion speed4. Due to this approximately
universal nature of v (whatever its value may actually
be), we refer to it as the dominant expansion velocity.
It is one of the two essential parameters in a cosmology
with expanding civilizations.
The appearance rate of such civilizations (with units
of appearances per Gly3 of co-moving volume per Gyr of
cosmic time) is denoted by f(t). Our prior assumptions
about f(t) are radically uncertain, but there is a simple
way to isolate and express most of the uncertainty. We
regard f(t) as the product f(t) = αF (t), where F (t) is
a dimensionless time dependence (normalized to a maxi-
mum value of unity), roughly mirroring the cosmic rate of
production of Earthlike planets [23], with a lag of several
Gyr to account for the long process of biological evolu-
tion [12] (see Figure 1). The parameter α (carrying the
units of appearances per Gly3 per Gyr) determines the
overall scale, where most of the uncertainty lies. With a
number less than 1.
3 We assume the following standard cosmology: ΩΛ0 = .692,
Ωr0 = 9 × 10−5, Ωm0 = 1 − Ωr0 − ΩΛ0, H0 = .069Gyr−1,
giving t0 = 13.8 Gyr.
4 The travel time between galaxies utterly dwarfs any other
timescale in the process of expansion, e.g. the time required to
reproduce between generations of spacecraft. Thus, if a civiliza-
tion is ambitious, their net expansion speed will be very close to
the speed of their intergalactic spacecraft. See appendix of [22]
for a detailed justification based on the spatial distribution of
galaxies in the universe.
3FIG. 1: A model for the cosmic time-dependence of the
appearance rate of advanced life, F (t), normalized to a
maximum value of unity. The full appearance rate of
ambitious expanding civilizations is given by
f(t) = αF (t), where α has units of appearances per
Gly3 per Gyr. This model for F (t) is effectively a
model of the planet formation rate of the cosmos, with
a lag of several Gyr to account for the evolution of
intelligent life.
model for the background cosmology and F (t) fixed, we
regard a scenario of expanding cosmological civilizations
as the pair of parameters {v, α}. While v is modestly
uncertain, almost the entire subject of this paper boils
down to finding an estimate for α.
It is now convenient to define s(t0) =∫ t0
0
F (t)V (t, t0) dt. For the standard cosmology
and the appearance rate function in Figure 1,
s(t0) ≈ 1268Gly3Gyr. The fraction of the uni-
verse that remains unsaturated by expanding life at the
present cosmic time is given by g(t0):
gα(t0) = e
−αv3s(t0). (2)
The (average) expected number of expanding cosmologi-
cal civilizations that are present/visible on our past light
cone is Eα(n):
Eα(n) = α(1− v3)s(t0), (3)
and the probability that there is at least one on our past
light cone is then:
pα(n ≥ 1) = 1− e−α(1−v3)s(t0). (4)
The recurring factor of (1 − v3) expresses the fact that
we count civilizations that have appeared within our past
light cone, but not within our “past saturation cone”
(which expands into our past with speed v), since our
position in space has apparently not been overtaken and
saturated by an expanding civilization.
As a practical matter, if one can see only a fraction of
the sky (due to the Zone of Avoidance or simply due to
incomplete galaxy surveys), multiply s(t0) in the expres-
sions for Eα(n) and pα(n ≥ 1) by the fraction of the sky
that is visible.
III. SELF-SAMPLING AND SELF-INDICATION
ASSUMPTIONS
The two most common schools of anthropic probabil-
ity are known as the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA)
and the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA) [11]. In this
section, we give a quick review of the reasoning of each
in the present context.
In SSA, we describe a “reference class” of civilizations
that are analogous to humanity, and favor theories of
the universe that make humanity more typical within the
reference class. Essentially, we are viewing humanity as
a random draw from a set of civilizations, and updating
our understanding of the universe based on the properties
of our draw.
There are multiple ways to arrive at the predictions of
SIA — here, we use a version called Full Non-Indexical
Conditioning (FNC) [24], which agrees with SIA in the
limit of observers who carry a significant amount of in-
formation5. Effectively, SIA favors theories that make it
more likely according to physical law that we should exist
here, in exactly our conditions. It works by saying the
conditions most likely to have produced us, are also the
conditions that produce many others like us. It makes
no appeal to a reference class.
A good way to see the distinction is to consider the
meaning of the probabilities appearing in a Bayesian
application of SSA and SIA. The likelihood function,
P (anthropic information | theory n) would, in SSA, rep-
resent the probability that a randomly selected member
of the reference class sees anthropic information, accord-
ing to theory n. In SIA, this quantity represents the prob-
ability that an observer who sees anthropic information
should appear at all, according to theory n. The alter-
native (complement of anthropic information) in SSA is
that a different member of the reference class is selected.
The alternative in SIA is that the observer who sees an-
thropic information does not exist.
In the present context, the anthropic information is
humanity’s cosmic time of arrival, t0, while theory n is
the value of the appearance rate, α.
The SSA approach we have previously used is to pre-
scribe a reference class of human-stage civilizations that
appear in galaxies that have not been saturated by am-
bitious life [12]. Then we can describe a cosmic time-of-
arrival (TOA) distribution of such civilizations according
to:
pTOA(t|α) = F (t)gα(t)∫∞
0
F (t′)gα(t′)dt′
. (5)
5 Predictions of FNC have been shown to differ from other pre-
sentations of SIA when “observers” are extremely simple beings,
who carry only a few bits of information [25]. We will not con-
sider this possibility, and the results we obtain here can also
be obtained using the older technique of modifying the prior to
cancel the reference class. For this reason we use FNC and SIA
interchangeably here.
4Given SSA, one assumes that humanity is a random sam-
ple from this distribution. To get predictions, one speci-
fies an assumption about humanity’s “typicality in time”
(whether were are at the average time of arrival, a one
standard-deviation latecomer, etc.) and finds the corre-
sponding value of α that matches t0 with the assumption.
This value of α is then used to get predictions according
to equations 3 and 4.
The SIA approach we will develop below is more di-
rectly Bayesian. The (unnormalized) likelihood of our
appearance here at cosmic time t0 is:
P (t0|α, γ) =  γ F (t0) gα(t0). (6)
Here  represents the probability of anthropic informa-
tion that is irrelevant to our problem. That is, we carry
a great deal of information in our memories that depends
on local events that have happened on the Earth, and the
probability of their occurrence is the fantastically small
number . It will cancel out with the normalization in
Bayes’ theorem. The new parameter γ gives the appear-
ance rate of human stage civilizations (when multiplied
by F (t)), and is related to α but carries is own uncer-
tainty. It too is destined to fall out of the analysis,
through its relationship to α. Very significant to this
approach is that the probability for humanity to occur
at t0 is proportional to gα(t0), the fraction of the uni-
verse that has not been overrun by ambitious life at the
present cosmic time.
This Bayesian approach requires us to specify a prior
pdf over α.
IV. PRIOR UNCERTAINTY
Before any observations or anthropic considerations
are made, we have essentially no ability to predict α.
Should α be of order 10, or of order 10−10? To reflect
this degree of uncertainty, we follow the reasoning of
Tegmark [26] and work exclusively with a prior pdf in
α, denoted P (α), that assigns equal weight to each order
of magnitude between αmin and αmax. Explicitly, this is
P (α) =
(
1
log(αmax/αmin)
)
1
α
. (7)
This kind of uncertainty tends to arise when a large
number of modestly uncertain factors contribute to the
value of α. This can be seen to occur, for example, in
an analysis of the Drake equation [27] — the product
of seven rough estimates does not result in an “order of
magnitude estimate.” It results in uncertainty that is
inevitably spread over many orders of magnitude [28].
Using the above prior, the question shifts to the end-
points. How many orders of magnitude should P (α) con-
tain? Lacki has considered priors for the prevalence of
life spanning 10122 orders of magnitude [29], but in our
context we only need the prior to stretch from about
αmin = 10
−6 to αmax = 10 (appearances per Glr3 per
Gyr). Predictions from the SIA will not substantially
change if the endpoints are extended further than that —
a surprising result to be justified below. In any case, the
next section will derive closed-form results that are valid
for any chosen values of αmin and αmax, and then take
the limit that the endpoints of the prior go to αmin → 0
and αmax →∞.
V. SIA APPLIED TO EXPANDING
COSMOLOGICAL CIVILIZATIONS:
PREDICTIONS FOR EXTRAGALACTIC SETI
To update our prior, P (α), our cosmic time of arrival
is particularly important. If the appearance rate α is too
high, the universe would long ago have been completely
saturated with expanding life. In other words, high val-
ues of α give gα(t0) ≈ 0, so there would be no opportunity
for us to arise in an empty (by all appearances) galaxy.
SIA encodes our anthropic information by expressing
the likelihood that we should appear at time t0 in an
untouched galaxy:
P (t0|α, γ) =  γ F (t0) gα(t0). (8)
As discussed in section III,  represents the incredibly
tiny probability of local events playing out for us in ex-
actly the way they have, and γ F (t0) represents the cos-
mic appearance rate of human stage life in unoccupied
space, at the present cosmic time. However, γ is not in-
dependent of α, since all expanding civilizations presum-
ably went through a stage of technological adolescence,
similar to the current state of humanity. This implies
γ should be larger than α by some unknown factor. In
other words, α = q γ, where q represents the fraction of
human-stage civilizations that go on to become expand-
ing cosmological civilizations. We expect that the ques-
tion of whether a given human-stage civilization goes on
to cosmological expansion depends almost entirely on lo-
cal events, so q should be independent of the cosmic time
of arrival. So while α and γ are not independent, we can
regard α and q as independent parameters, giving:
P (t0|α, q) =  α
q
F (t0) gα(t0). (9)
Since our prior assumptions about α and q are indepen-
dent of one another, and the above likelihood function
factors, it is simple to marginalize over q, giving:
P (t0|α) =  αF (t0) gα(t0). (10)
Invoking Bayes’ theorem, we then get the SIA predic-
tion for α, given that we have arrived at cosmic time
t0:
P (α|t0) = α gα(t0)P (α)∫ αmax
αmin
α′ gα′(t0)P (α′) dα′
(11)
=
s(t0) v
3 e(αmin+αmax−α)s(t0)v
3
eαmaxs(t0)v3 − eαmins(t0)v3 . (12)
So long as our prior is sufficiently spread out (and we
avoid considering tiny values of the expansion speed v —
5more about this below), this result is well-approximated
by taking the limit that αmin → 0 and αmax → ∞,
giving:
P (α|t0) = s(t0) v3 e−α s(t0) v3 . (13)
We can now use this posterior to get SIA predictions
for the number of visible civilizations, and the probability
at least one is visible, by using equations 3 and 4:
E(n) =
∫ αmax
αmin
Eα(n)P (α|t0) dα (14)
=
(
1− v3)(αmaxs(t0) + 1
v3
− s(t0)(αmax − αmin)e
αmaxs(t0)v
3
eαmaxs(t0)v3 − eαmins(t0)v3
)
(15)
→ 1
v3
− 1 (16)
and
p(n ≥ 1) =
∫ αmax
αmin
pα(n ≥ 1)P (α|t0) dα (17)
= 1− v
3
(
eαmaxs(t0) − eαmins(t0)) es(t0)(v3−1)(αmax+αmin)
eαmaxs(t0)v3 − eαmins(t0)v3 (18)
→ 1− v3 (19)
where the arrows in the final lines indicate taking the
limit of αmin → 0 and αmax →∞.
Since E(n) diverges, one can see that the αmax →
∞ approximation is breaking down for tiny values of v.
With smaller v, the posterior puts more weight on higher
values of α. At very tiny values of v, it begins telling
us that the appearance rate for expanding civilizations
is greater than the formation rate of planets — a non-
physical manifestation of allowing αmax →∞.
Reasonable values of v avoid this. Already at v = 0.1,
essentially all of the probability weight is well under
α = 10 appearances per Gly3 per Gyr, and there is no
problem with allowing αmax → ∞. In principle, s(t0)
could also be made tiny to exacerbate the problem, but
doing so would require a truly bizarre model of F (t) to
alter conclusions for v ≥ 0.1. So long as estimates of v
and s(t0) are not completely shocking, the αmax → ∞
limit is an excellent approximation. This point is illus-
trated in Figure 2, where a direct comparison to the case
of αmin = 10
−5 and αmax = 10−1 is shown.
As noted in section II, it easy to account for the pos-
sibility that a survey covers only a fraction FracSky of
the sky. The SIA results for such a survey are:
E(n) = FracSky
(
1
v3
− 1
)
(20)
p(n ≥ 1) = 1− v
3
1 +
(
1
FracSky − 1
)
v3
. (21)
Results for values of FracSky equal to 1, 0.8, and 0.35 are
shown in Figure 3. These values correspond respectively
to the full sky, the full sky minus the Zone of Avoid-
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FIG. 2: A prior pdf P (α) over the appearance rate α
that stretches between αmin = 10
−5 and αmax = 10−1,
along with its anthropic SIA update P (α|t0). Also
depicted is the SIA update of a prior in the limit that
αmin → 0 and αmax →∞. There is no visible
distinction — SIA effectively does not care how spread
out is the prior, beyond the first few orders of
magnitude.
ance, and the coverage of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey
(DR10) [30].
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FIG. 3: SIA estimated probability (as a function of the
dominant expansion velocity v) that one or more
expanding cosmological civilizations are visible on the
full sky (FracSky = 1), the full sky minus the Zone of
Avoidance (FracSky = 0.8), and the coverage of the
Sloan Digital Sky Survey (FracSky = 0.35).
VI. UPDATES BASED ON SEARCH RESULTS
The Bayesian framework lends itself to taking the next
step. Suppose that in the near future, a full-sky galaxy
survey has been completed and discovers n cosmological
civilizations expanding at speed v. What would that do
for our knowledge of α? Such an update would be the
final word on SIA estimates for α, until a cosmological
time has passed, allowing more information to slowly ac-
cumulate.
We can perform such an update by noting the appear-
ance of expanding civilizations is a Poisson process (ap-
pearances are independent events), and thus the proba-
bility to observe exactly n is:
p(n|α) = Eα(n)
n
n!
e−Eα(n). (22)
Feeding this into Bayes’ theorem to update our earlier
SIA estimate gives:
P (α|n) = p(n|α)P (α|t0)∫
p(n|α′)P (α′|t0) dα′ . (23)
Using the limit of αmin → 0 and αmax →∞ for P (α|t0),
this returns:
P (α|n) = s(t0)
n!
(α s(t0))
n
e−α s(t0). (24)
Note that this result is independent of v — the act of
performing a definitive search cancels all velocity depen-
dence from our knowledge of α, even in the case of a null
result, with an observation of n = 0 civilizations.
The SIA estimate of P (α|t0) begins with uncertainty
spread over about three orders of magnitude (for any pro-
posed value of v). A null result (n = 0) does not improve
this uncertainty (except to eliminate dependence on v),
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FIG. 4: SIA estimate of α after update from a
hypothetical full-sky survey that detects n expanding
civilizations, for n = 0 (null result), n = 1, n = 10, and
n = 100.
but the greater the value of n, the less uncertainty we
have. An observation of n = 1 narrows the uncertainty
to within two orders of magnitude. An observation of
n = 10 would narrow uncertainty to within a single or-
der of magnitude. Figure 4 shows P (α|n) for several
hypothetical values of n.
VII. THE FINAL EXTENT OF LIFE IN THE
COSMOS
After updating our SIA estimate to P (α|n) (from ob-
serving “n” expanding civs), we are in a position to ad-
dress a fundamental question about the ultimate role of
life in the universe.
The fraction of the universe that remains forever un-
touched by life is gα(t→∞), given by:
gα(t→∞) = e−αv3s(∞) (25)
with s(∞) = ∫∞
0
F (t)V (t,∞) dt — a finite quantity in
the standard cosmology. With our model for F (t), we
get s(∞) ≈ 207986.
We can then calculate its expected value, based on
SIA and an observation of n expanding civilizations at
the current cosmic time, according to:
En(g(t→∞)) =
∫ ∞
0
gα(t→∞)P (α|n) dα (26)
=
(
s(t0)
s(t0) + s(∞) v3
)n+1
. (27)
Figure 5 illustrates expected values of g(t→∞). The
conclusion is quite consistent for any value of “n.” If
ambitious civilizations can expand at a middling to high
fraction of the speed of light, then life will come to sat-
urate most of the cosmos. This remains true even for
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FIG. 5: Expected fraction of the universe remaining
untouched by expansionistic life at late cosmic time
(t→∞), based on the updated SIA estimate of α after
observing n = 0, n = 1, n = 10, or n = 100 expanding
civilizations at the present cosmic time. If high-v
expansion is practical, the SIA expectation is simply
that ambitious life will come to dominate the universe.
the case of n = 0 (a null search result) — it is a nearly-
unavoidable feature of using the SIA6.
VIII. COMPARISON TO SSA-BASED
ESTIMATES
The SIA estimate is different in character from the
prior uses of SSA [12–14], offering major advantages and
simplifications. It also introduces the well-known con-
ceptual challenges connected to the SIA.
A drawback of the earlier SSA-based approach is that
it requires a model of F (t) throughout all time, including
the extreme future, where such models are most uncer-
tain. For example, the habitability of class M stars, with
their extreme lifetimes, is controversial, and such con-
siderations can heavily influence models for F (t) in the
far future [31]. It also contains a very counter-intuitive
feature that life-hostile conditions at earlier times in the
universe can increase estimates for α and our probability
to observe expanding civilizations7 [32]. The previous
SSA approach has been criticized for a reliance on the
idea of “typicality in time.” [33] The results of the SSA
approach also tend to be inconvenient to compute.
6 Unlike the previous sections, this result depends on our model
for F (t) into the cosmic future (through s(∞)). So although our
conclusion is nearly independent of n, it is more vulnerable to
major modeling changes.
7 This can be understood as analogous to the Doomsday Argu-
ment. Assuming more life-hostile conditions at substantially ear-
lier times in the universe means that we are closer to the earliest
possible civilization, and this makes “Doomsday” (the appear-
ance of expanding civilizations) more probable, to compensate.
A simplified approach to using SSA is to set an an-
thropic bound — a maximum plausible value of α that
implies opportunities for human-stage life to appear are
in rapid decline, due to displacement of galaxies by am-
bitious life [14]. This will imply bounds on E(n) and
p(n ≥ 1). While this approach is far easier to compute,
it is merely a quick way to rule out high values of α —
it cannot make a true prediction without a prior over α
that will control the result.
The SIA approach developed in the previous sections
answers nearly all of these drawbacks of the SSA. It does
not rely on assumptions about humanity’s typicality in
time. It does not require a model of F (t) that stretches
into the distant future. It is easy to compute. Life-hostile
conditions in the past do not paradoxically imply that life
is easier to observe in the present. It makes very modest
demands of our prior assumption about α, requiring only
that the prior is sufficiently spread out on a logarithmic
scale to return closed-form, model-independent results.
It is not vulnerable to the “reference class problem” of the
SSA. And it makes true predictions, not merely setting
bounds.
It is also more optimistic than SSA-based predictions.
If the dominant expansion speed is below about v = 0.8,
then SIA gives odds better than 50% that an expand-
ing cosmological civilization is visible on our past light
cone. To get similar predictions, earlier SSA estimates
would require us to assume that humanity has appeared
between one and two standard deviations later than the
average time of arrival [12].
On the other hand, the very fact that SIA predictions
are so model-independent might actually be cause for
skepticism. What is such model-independence saying?
SIA is so strong that the background cosmology, the rel-
ative time dependence F (t) for life, and the endpoints of
the prior (αmax and αmax) are falling out of the key pre-
dictions because they are not important enough to matter.
This suggests that invoking SIA is a strong assumption
indeed.
In fact, this is related to the “Presumptuous Philoso-
pher” thought experiment, which was designed to show-
case the unreasonable strength of SIA [11, 17]. In Pre-
sumptuous Philosopher, SIA so heavily favors conditions
for plentiful life, that a philosopher is happy to go deeply
into debt, placing bet after bet in favor of life, even in
the face of strong experimental evidence piling up against
him. Invoking SIA, in the Presumptuous Philosopher
scenario, is actually stronger than observation.
In the present case, the strength of SIA manifests in a
slightly different way. SIA does not blindly favor “more
life” — it favors more life with exactly our anthropic
information. Conditions that are too favorable for ex-
pansionistic life must be ruled out, because SIA favors
conditions for us to appear at the present cosmic time, in
an empty galaxy — too many expanding civilizations di-
minish the opportunity for that to occur. The strength of
SIA is not manifesting in enormous estimates for life (the
predicted values of α are, after all, rather tiny) — it is
8manifesting in a very specific pdf, P (α|t0), no matter how
conservatively spread out our prior may be. The amount
of information gained by invoking SIA is enormous8. Our
model could result in a presumptuous philosopher, if he
is placing bets about α to occur within a few specific
orders of magnitude.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
To those familiar with SSA vs. SIA debates, it may not
be surprising that an anthropic SIA model of extragalac-
tic civilizations has two prominent features: Increased
simplicity, and surprisingly high certainty. These are ex-
actly the lessons of the SIA in two of the most famous
anthropic thought experiments — the Doomsday Argu-
ment and the Presumptuous Philosopher [11].
Their presence here is stark. For dominant expansion
velocity v (whose value is a technological question), the
“bottom line” is that the expected number of expanding
cosmological civilizations that should be visible on our
past light cone is 1v3 −1, and the probability for us to see
at least one is 1 − v3 — this is true for any reasonable
standard model cosmology, and any reasonable model for
the relative appearance rate, F (t). And no matter how
conservatively spread out one’s prior assumptions about
the magnitude of the appearance rate — take for example
Lacki’s 10122 orders of magnitude [29] — the SIA poste-
rior always narrows the uncertainty down to about three
orders of magnitude.
If one is convinced of the SIA, it difficult to avoid these
conclusions. It could be the case that expanding civi-
lizations have very little impact on their occupied galax-
ies, making them invisible from a cosmological distance.
This would be difficult to square with the maximum
power principle [19], and the fact that Dyson swarms are
not a particularly exotic or difficult technology [10, 35].
It could be that some expanding civilizations will de-
liberately adopt a strategy of “stealth expansion” until
late cosmic times, to avoid influencing potential competi-
tors [22]. Or it could be that intergalactic expansion is
physically impossible. None of these is a particularly
compelling escape. In our opinion, the weakest link is
the use of the SIA itself — it would not be a huge sur-
prise to learn that SSA or some other approach is more
appropriate for cosmology.
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